Prof. Havva Kök Arslan, Head of the Department of Political Science and International Relations (English) at Üsküdar University Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, evaluated the latest developments in the Middle East following the attacks on Iran.
The Middle East is experiencing another sharp break
Emphasizing that the crisis cannot be read merely as a military tension between two countries, Prof. Arslan said, “The Middle East is experiencing another sharp break. The attacks on Iran are not just a military tension between two countries; they are a regional phase of a global power struggle.”
“In the 19th century, land was shared; now energy corridors, logistics lines, and technology ecosystems are being shared,” said Prof. Arslan, stating that Iran is also “a critical front in this new war of sharing.” She added, “The real question is: Is this a series of limited operations, or the beginning of a deeper strategic goal?”
Exceptions are clear in international law
Regarding the evaluation of the attacks from the perspective of international law, Prof. Arslan said, “In international relations literature, the weakening, fragmentation, or "erosion of functional capacity" of states is not a new method. The examples of Iraq, Libya, and Syria are still fresh in memory. Can the Iran file be read within this framework? The United Nations Charter prohibits the use of force; the exceptions are clear: a Security Council resolution or legitimate self-defense against an explicit armed attack.”
Stating that the “preemptive strike doctrine is legally debatable,” Prof. Arslan emphasized that military operations initiated before diplomatic channels are exhausted would produce not only legal but also systemic instability. She used the expression, “If this method becomes normalized, tomorrow any country could be targeted on the grounds of a ‘potential threat’.”
Prof. Arslan stated that Türkiye’s principled framework is clear: “Respect for territorial integrity, the exceptional nature of the use of force, and prioritizing diplomacy are our fundamental references. However, the issue is not merely legal; the real issue is strategic intent.”
Block formation already existed in the Middle East
“Block formation already existed in the Middle East. This crisis will deepen and clarify existing axes,” said Prof. Arslan. “While the Western axis, comprising the USA, Israel, and some Gulf countries, pursues a policy based on naval power and prioritizing financial instruments; the Eurasian axis, including Iran, Russia, and China, prioritizes land power and energy corridors. However, the situation cannot be reduced to these two axes. 'Middle belt' countries such as Türkiye, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt stand out as actors that move between the two axes and sometimes serve as balancing factors.”
Noting that barely a year has passed since Israel targeted Iran in June 2025, Prof. Arslan said, “The new wave of operations is not a coincidence. The aim is not temporary pressure, but to systematically erode Iran’s capacity to resist. A weak actor is considered more controllable than a strong Iran. Türkiye, on the other hand, can neither fully integrate into the Western axis nor position itself on the Russia-Iran line. NATO membership, energy dependence, and regional security risks compel Ankara towards a balance policy. This balance must be active, not passive. Parameters such as energy, security, and national integrity will determine Ankara’s strategy. MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli’s emphasis on ‘looking at the world from Ankara’ means centering one’s own national interests.”
The aim may not be temporary pressure, but systematic erosion
Stating that she does not see the new wave of operations after Israel targeted Iran in June 2025 as a coincidence, Prof. Arslan said, “The issue may not be temporary military pressure; it could be to systematically erode Iran’s capacity to resist.”
“Even if the conflicts were to cease today, a third and fourth wave could follow,” said Prof. Arslan, stating that this is consistent with the logic of classical power politics, and she used the expression, “A controllable Iran is preferred over a strong Iran.”
Türkiye's defense industry emerged stronger from every crisis
Prof. Arslan also noted that Türkiye’s defense industry emerged stronger from every crisis. “In the 1990s, counter-terrorism, and in the 2010s, cross-border operations accelerated domestic production. This crisis will create a similar effect. Air defense systems, long-range missiles, UAV/UCAVs, and electronic warfare systems will be priority areas. Cyber security is also more critical now; the Iran example showed that intelligence can leak before a missile strike. Türkiye, with its FETÖ experience, is resilient against internal infiltrations, but it must strengthen its cyber defense. A ‘multi-dimensional’ approach will solidify in foreign policy. But this is not just a balance policy; it means autonomy based on its own technological capacity. A country not dependent on others’ weapons will not be under the influence of others’ politics. The breakthrough in the defense industry will be the foundation of military and diplomatic independence,” she said.
Leader change does not mean system collapse
Referring to discussions on the fragility of the regime in Iran, Prof. Arslan said, “In such political cultures, a change in leadership does not mean the collapse of the system. Iran has institutional continuity; when the position of religious leader becomes vacant, a new name is appointed, and the structure continues.”
Recalling that Iran did not surrender despite heavy losses in the eight-year war with Iraq, Prof. Arslan said, “It is not realistic for the regime to change overnight. On the contrary, the perception of external intervention can create consolidation within society.” Prof. Arslan assessed, “History shows that external intervention sometimes produces consolidation, not disintegration.”
Türkiye and the balance policy
Prof. Arslan stated that while blocks exist in the region, the current tension appears to be part of a larger global competition, saying, “There is a systemic struggle ongoing through energy lines, logistics corridors, and military bases.”
Emphasizing Türkiye's unique position in this picture, Prof. Arslan said, “Türkiye is neither a country that can entirely melt into the Western axis nor an actor that can be positioned on the Russia-Iran line. NATO membership, energy dependence, and regional security risks compel Ankara towards a balance policy.”
A border exceeding 500 kilometers is directly affected by a potential crisis
Regarding the effects of a possible regional war on Türkiye, Prof. Arslan stated that the scenario of Iran’s weakening or fragmentation is not an abstract analysis for Türkiye, and said, “A border exceeding 500 kilometers is directly affected by a potential crisis.”
Prof. Arslan also listed the possible consequences, drawing attention to the risks of “new waves of migration, the collapse of border trade, PKK exploiting potential vacuums, and some armed Kurdish groups in Iran gaining room for maneuver.” Prof. Arslan used the expression, “If there is a fire on the other side of the border, this side also gets warm.”
Emphasis on sovereignty must be maintained
Prof. Arslan stated that the US military presence in the region brings Türkiye’s NATO infrastructure to the agenda, noting that İncirlik Air Base and Kürecik Radar Base are particularly debated in public. She said, “Türkiye’s position is sensitive. The emphasis on sovereignty must be maintained, but crisis management must be conducted rationally. Ankara being perceived as a direct party to the war is not in Türkiye’s interest.”
Strategic reason, not emotional reflex
Prof. Arslan stated that Türkiye faces two approaches: “Taking a position with emotional reflexes or acting with long-term strategic reason.”
Using the expressions “Realism is not isolation. Creating balance is not weakness,” Prof. Arslan emphasized that the scenario of eroding Iran’s state capacity is not an issue to be “watched from afar” for Türkiye.
Prof. Arslan concluded her remarks with the following statements:“Türkiye’s geopolitics generates risks; but the same geopolitics, when managed correctly, also generates opportunities. The scenario of eroding Iran’s state capacity is not an issue to be ‘watched from afar’ for Türkiye. Such a break directly affects Anatolia. Therefore, Ankara’s calculation should be based on a long-term security architecture rather than short-term political positions. MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli’s emphasis on an ‘Ankara-centric geopolitics’ gains meaning precisely in such a period: neither pursuing imperial dreams nor withdrawing inwards; but protecting the homeland and centering national interests. In conclusion; the direction of the crisis may be uncertain. However, Türkiye’s direction must not be uncertain.”
